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The EU’s rule of law promotion in post-Soviet 
Europe: what explains the divergence between 
Baltic States and EaP countries? 
 
Martin MENDELSKI* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The European Union (EU) and domestic “change agents” have promoted the rule 
of law in post-Soviet Europe with varying results. While the Baltic States (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania) succeeded in establishing the rule of law, Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) did not. 
Why did EU-driven legal, judicial and anti-corruption reforms not produce the rule 
of law in the latter group? I argue that divided elites (reformers) in laggard EaP 
countries engage in detrimental political competition that creates incentives to 
misuse the law, the prosecution and judicial structures as “political weapons”. The 
result of this power struggle is an erratic reform process which produces reform 
pathologies of Europeanization (e.g. legal instability and incoherence, reinforced 
fragmentation and politicization) that undermine the rule of law. Instead of serving 
as an external check on rule-of-law abusing reformers, the EU empowers reformist 
but unaccountable “change agents” in a partisan way, thus creating incentives for 
the accumulation and abuse of power, especially after regime changes. Reformers 
in the advanced Baltic States have avoided detrimental political competition, the 
fragmentation of the state and many reform pitfalls through de facto exclusion of 
ethnic Russians from the political and judicial system. This policy of partial 
exclusion allowed elites in Estonia and Latvia to build consensus, to create a unitary 
state, including strong, unified and independent horizontal accountability structures 
(e.g. judiciary, Ombudsman, Constitutional Court etc.) which in turn were able to 
check the executive. The argument is supported by an empirical, indicator-based 
analysis of the rule of law and several interviews with representatives in Brussels, 
Strasbourg and Chisinau.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been hailed by EU 
representatives as an effective strategy to bring about stability, democracy and the 
rule of law towards its neighbours. This initial (over)optimism was echoed by the 
Europeanization literature which argued that the EU has transformative and 
democratizing power (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Vachudova, 2005; 
Ekiert, Kubik and Vachudova, 2007; Grabbe, 2006). However, “in contrast to the 
success of enlargement…” (in Baltic States), “…the ENP has been seen as a 
failure” (Vachudova, 2015, p. 527). In 2015, the European Commission itself 
published a joint consultation paper with the title “Towards a new European 
Neighbourhood Policy” (European Commission, 2015). This document has 
identified the shortcomings of the ENP and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and 
questioned the effectiveness and suitability of formal tools (e.g. action plans, 
monitoring) to bring about progress. 
How effective was the ENP in promoting the rule of law? More than a 
decade after the Eastern enlargement from 2004 and the launch of the ENP shortly 
afterwards, key indicators on the rule of law suggest that the rule of law has not 
improved significantly and even deteriorated in most EaP countries (e.g. Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine). The stagnating and even declining 
trends are reflected in the Freedom House judicial framework and independence 
indicator and the Bertelsmann rule of law index, both of which show no overall 
improvement, despite the millions of euros spent on judicial and anti-corruption 
reforms. Between 1997 and 2014, Freedom House’s judicial framework and 
independence index decreased from 3.3 to 2.4 for EaP countries (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) on an inverted scale where 1=worst and 
7=best. Between 2004 and 2014, the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation 
(BTI) rule of law index decreased slightly from 5.1 to 5.0 on a scale where 
1=worst and 10=best. In contrast, the advanced group of Baltic States (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania) improved their FH ratings from 5.7 to 6.3, while their BTI score 
decreased only slightly (-0.1). Overall, there seems to be a persisting divergence 
between the two groups of countries despite similar communist legacies and 
despite a similar pressure for reform by the EU and the international donor 
community.  
What impact does the EU have on the rule of law in post-Soviet European 
countries (Baltic States and EaP countries) and why does the rule of law not 
improve in the latter group? The Europeanization and rule of law literature have 
provided inconclusive answers to this question. Some authors argued that the EU 
is able to bring about the rule of law in this region and, in particular, in the 
advanced Visegrad or Baltic States (Pridham, 2008; Mendelski, 2009). Several 
authors from edited volumes also acknowledge the limits of Europeanization with 
regard to the rule of law and suggest a mixed or ambiguous impact (both positive 
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and negative) of the EU (Magen and Morlino, 2009; Sadurski, Czarnota, and 
Krygier, 2006; Morlino and Sadurski, 2010). Others have been more pessimistic 
and argue that the ENP has failed to democratize the region (Nilsson and Silander, 
2016), that the rule of law has not been established due to domestic hindrances by 
domestic “veto players” (Petrov and Serdyuk, 2009; Tudoroiu, 2015; Burlyuk, 
2015; Kuzio, 2016a; Hale and Orttung, 2016) or due to the problems with the EU’s 
rule of law promotion and assessment (Kochenov, 2008; Toneva-Metodieva, 
2014; Dimitrov, Haralampiev, Stoychev and Toneva-Metodieva, 2014; Slapin, 
2015; Mendelski, 2015; 2016; Pech, 2016). The scholarly controversy on the EU’s 
impact reflects an unresolved puzzle which is also reflected in the divergent trends 
in the rule of law among the post-Soviet countries.  
This article argues that the EU’s impact is uneven. Rule of law reforms in 
general (and the EU in particular) have a context-dependent effect, which can be 
positive in more advanced countries (Baltic States) and negative (pathological) in 
less advanced countries (EaP countries). In particular, while EU-driven judicial 
reforms increase judicial capacity and align domestic legislation with European 
and international standards (substantive legality), reforms do not improve and in 
fact lead to a deterioration of judicial impartiality and formal legality, thus 
undermining the development of the rule of law. It is important to bear in mind 
that the “pathological power” of the EU (Mendelski, 2015) is stronger and more 
harmful in the laggard countries (EaP) than in the frontrunners (Baltic States), 
where pathologies of Europeanization have been mostly avoided.  
The EU’s pathological impact is attributed to its naive approach to reform, 
which is based on the partisan support of unaccountable reformers. To be more 
clear, the EU empowers and supports controversial “change agents” (e.g. 
controversial, pro-Western oligarchs), and grants them “honeymoon” periods of 
transition in which they are able to accumulate and abuse power. To support their 
pro-Western “change agents” of reform, the EU refrains from an impartial, 
objective and qualitative rule of law assessment and promotion. The reasons for 
partisanship are related to geopolitical, business and security motives (e.g. to 
counter Russia’s influence and that of Eastwards-oriented oligarchs). The 
consequence of this partisan strategy is a deficient process of reform, the 
accumulation of unaccountable power in the hands of pro-Western change agents 
and the deterioration of the rule of law. Overall, the external empowerment of 
domestic elites in EaP countries (by the EU and Russia) has produced harmful 
competition between domestic oligarchs, increasing the politicization and 
fragmentation of state structures (e.g. judiciary, prosecution, accountability 
mechanisms) and a polarized society. The Baltic States, although ethnically 
fragmented, have avoided similar divisions among political elites and inside the 
state. By partially excluding a considerable part of ethnic Russians (including their 
political representatives) from state structures (including the judiciary) they have 
been able to avoid detrimental political competition and the partisan 
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empowerment and fractionalization of their elites from abroad, thus avoiding 
several reform pathologies (e.g. the fragmentation and instability of law, the 
politicization/polarization of the judiciary) which in turn facilitated the creation 
of the rule of law. 
The next section briefly introduces my four-dimensional concept of the rule 
of law. Section 3 provides quantitative evidence on the trends in rule of law 
development in post-Soviet countries over the last 15 years. Section 4 provides a 
causal explanation for the lack of improvement in the rule of law in the EaP region 
and progress in the Baltic States. The paper concludes with some policy 
recommendations for the EU and for practitioners. 
 
2. Theoretical framework: the rule of law, a four-dimensional concept 
 
I propose a four-dimensional concept of the rule of law, consisting of four 
distinct dimensions: Formal legality, substantive legality, judicial capacity and 
judicial impartiality (Mendelski, 2014; 2015). While the two former dimensions 
refer to the quality of the formal rules (de jure rule of law), the two latter 
dimensions refer to the quality of the judicial system (de facto rule of law).  
First, the formal legality dimension includes the formal and procedural 
aspects of the rule of law (i.e. the “internal morality of law”) which require laws 
to be general, publically promulgated, clear, non-retroactive, non-contradictory, 
possible to comply with, relatively stable, and enforced (Fuller, 1969, p. 46). My 
main focus will be on the stability of rules. Stability of laws implies that laws 
remain stable or unchanged for a period of time long enough to provide the 
necessary predictability and constraints for decision makers.  
Second, substantive legality reflects a thick and substantive concept of the 
rule of law (Hart, 1961) and requires the presence of morally “good” laws which 
comply with certain principles (e.g. justice, equality before the law) and certain 
rights (civil, political and socio-economic human rights) (Tamanaha, 2004). These 
principles and rights are commonly associated with international human rights 
norms and best-practices of governance (e.g. UN basic principles on the 
independence of the judiciary). International organizations, including the EU, 
promote alignment with international human rights standards and best-practices 
and, in so doing, try to legally embed countries in the universal rules of the 
European or international legal system (Simmons, 2009). 
Third, judicial capacity includes the inputs, means and resources to 
establish a capable judicial system (Mendelski, 2012; 2014). It is associated with 
the ability of a professional judiciary to enforce legislation in an efficient, timely 
and effective way. In particular, judicial capacity reflects the quantity and quality 
of the financial, technical and human resources required to establish a capable 
judicial system. However, higher judicial capacity does not automatically imply a 
better rule of law: resources (e.g. new computers, more prosecutors) can be 
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misused to advance particularistic interests, such as political power, for instance 
in a politicized fight against corruption.  
Fourth, judicial impartiality refers to the unbiased and impersonal 
enforcement of the law by independent, non-corrupt and accountable magistrates. 
The sub-components belonging to the judicial impartiality dimension include: 1. 
Judicial independence, 2. Separation of powers, 3. Accountability towards the 
law, 5. Judicial accountability.  
Finally, all four dimensions of the rule of law are interdependent. In order 
to create the rule of law, international donors must seek to improve all four 
dimensions in a balanced way. Achieving progress in one dimension and 
regressing in others does not necessarily enhance the rule of law. For instance, 
aligning domestic legislation with international standards will not establish the 
rule of law if the new laws and regulations become unstable, incoherent or are not 
enforced. Similarly, creating capable but not sufficiently impartial judiciaries (and 
vice versa) will not necessarily improve the rule of law. The next section shows 
that the EU (together with its domestic reformers) had precisely such an uneven 
effect on the four dimensions of the rule of law during the EU pre-accession 
period:1 while substantive legality and judicial capacity improved, formal legality 
and judicial impartiality stagnated and partially even deteriorated, especially in 
the less advanced EaP countries. 
 
3. Empirical trends: comparative development of the rule of law in EaP and 
Baltic states 
 
3.1. Empirical puzzle: divergence in the rule of law 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that post-Soviet countries can be grouped in a 
frontrunner, strong rule of law group (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and a laggard 
weak rule of law group (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan)2. Both 
the Freedom House indicator Judicial Framework and Independence and the rule 
of law indicator from the Bertelsmann Transition Index (BTI) exhibit a persisting 
and even growing divergence between the two groups (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). 
This is puzzling because (1) all countries were part of the Soviet Union and thus 
                                                     
1 The EU conditionality has begun to stimulate legal and judicial changes in the Baltic 
States since 1995/1998 (with the start of the pre-accession period to the EU) and in the 
EaP Countries since 2005, the official start of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
However, legal cooperation, adaptation and approximation had occurred already since the 
1990s. 
2 A brief note on case selection: I exclude several post-Soviet countries (Russia, Belarus, 
Central Asian Republics) from the comparative analysis as I intend to focus solely on the 
countries which have been subject to EU conditionality in the area of the rule of law. This 
was hardly the case for these countries and no Action Plans are foreseen for them. 
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have a common history (historical legacy) which affected the way justice is done 
and (2) all countries experienced similar pressure for reform from abroad (EU 
conditionality), albeit the timing of conditionality varied. Nevertheless, despite 
the external pressure for judicial and anti-corruption reform in the framework of 
the Eastern Partnership since 2005, rule of law indicators do not converge and 
there is no significant catching-up of the laggard countries. This puzzle of 
divergence will be answered in section 4, where I will argue that rule of law 
reforms (and EU conditionality) have a context-dependent and uneven effect, 
which can improve or undermine the rule of law. Thus, reforms do not 
automatically mean progress, but can, on the contrary, lead to deterioration. I will 
now analyze the development of the rule of law across its four dimensions (and 
the EU’s potential impact). I rely on more specific indicators, which assess the 
internal and external quality of the law and the quality of the judiciary. 
 
Figure 1. Freedom House judicial framework and independence in post-
Soviet states 
 
Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit. 
Notes: This indicator highlights constitutional reform, human rights protections, criminal 
code reform, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of 
equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial 
decisions. Scale from 1 (worst) - 7 (best), original values were inverte. 
 
3.2. Quality of law: the EU aligns domestic laws with international standards 
(substantive legality), but undermines legal stability (formal legality)  
 
Has the EU improved the de jure rule of law, i.e. the quality of the law? 
Figures 3 and 4 exhibit a potentially uneven (i.e. both positive and negative) 
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impact of EU-driven reforms on the rule of law in Baltic States and EaP countries. 
While substantive legality increased in both groups (as reflected in the increased 
legal approximation to international human rights norms), formal legality, and, in 
particular, the output and stability of laws, deteriorated.  
 
Figure 2. BTI rule of law in post-Soviet states 
 
Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index.  
Note: Scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best). 
 
Substantive legality is measured by the number of ratified human rights 
treaties (see Figure 1). Two main observations can be made. First, there has been 
considerable progress in this dimension. Over the course of time, all countries 
have ratified more and more international human rights treaties. The overall 
positive trend in both groups indicates that the ratification of de jure human rights 
is relatively unproblematic (Landman, 2004). Interestingly, the average score of 
EaP countries suggests that they have, since 1993, outperformed the Baltic States 
by ratifying more international human rights treaties. Ukraine and Azerbaijan 
were particularly active in signing them, which is however not always reflected in 
the de facto respect of human rights. Second, there were two periods of 
acceleration in which the ratification of international treaties and conventions 
grew considerably. The first period (1990–1993) comprises the first years after 
the fall of communism, and the second period (1998–2004) can be associated with 
the EU pre-accession period. This later period of alignment of legislation with 
European laws (acquis communautaire and the case law of the ECtHR) resulted 
in considerable legal approximation and rule adoption in the EaP region (see 
individual country chapters in Van Elsuwege and Petrov, 2014).  
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Figure 3. Development of substantive legality (rule approximation) in CEE 
 
Source: Data based on Simmons 2009, provided to the author by Beth Simmons. 
Notes: The indicator is based on the concept of “legal embeddedness” which calculates 
the proportion of 20 of the more important human rights-related treaties ratified by each 
state. It additionally includes three regional agreements (Europe, Americas, and Africa). 
The scale ranges from 0 (worst performance) to 1 (best performance). 
 
Figure 4. Development of formal legality (legislative output) in post-Soviet 
countries 
 
Source: Own dataset compiled by the author. 
Notes: The data is based on the information from the national parliaments of Eastern 
Partnership countries and the Baltic States. The legislative output is measured as the 
simple average of nationally adopted laws per year. Data for Azerbaijan is not included. 
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Formality legality (the internal morality of law) is measured by the number 
of adopted laws per year, i.e. the legislative output per year (see Figure 4). The 
indicator is used here as a proxy indicator for measuring the stability of laws, 
which is a crucial aspect of formal legality. This decision can be justified by the 
very common practice that most of the newly adopted laws are in fact amendments 
to the existing legal framework. Two main patterns can be observed during the 
period between 1990 and 2013. First, the legislative output increased in all 
countries, except for Estonia which remained at a similar level. Second, on 
average, legislative output has been growing much more in the EaP countries than 
in the Baltic States. In the advanced Baltic States, the number of adopted laws per 
year during the pre-accession period to the EU (1995-2004) almost doubled. In 
Latvia, it rose from 191 to 343 adopted laws, in Lithuania from 264 to 434, and in 
Estonia, from 117 to 226 laws adopted per year. After EU entry, it remained at a 
relatively high level in Lithuania and Latvia (around 400), suggesting a persisting 
pathology, and considerably decreased in Estonia, suggesting a temporary 
pathology.  
In the less advanced EaP countries, the legislative output has increased by 
approx. 400% since 1995, in the Baltic States only by approx. 100 %. This 
suggests that the potential impact of EU-driven reform (rule approximation) was 
more pathological in the former, laggard group. Moldova is a telling example. 
Here, the EU (and donor) pressure for judicial and prosecutorial reform, resulted 
in several reform waves and numerous amendments of legislation. For instance, 
Law no. 294 on the Prosecution3 was modified 16 times between 2009 and 2016 
(i.e. under the pro-Western Alliance for European Integration). Law no. 514 on 
judicial organization4 was modified 18 times between 2002 and 2012. The penal 
code in Moldova was modified 61 times between 2010 and 20165. Data on the 
number of adopted laws from the Ukrainian parliament indicates an escalating 
trend which peaked after the Orange revolution in the sixth convocation period 
(2007-2012) with 1165 laws. For instance, the economic code of Ukraine was 
amended 50 times between 2003 and 20126. After the Euromaidan, the legislative 
output accelerated again, this time through increased mis(use) of accelerated 
procedures. Similarly, after the regime change in Georgia (Rose revolution in 
November 2003), the legislative output almost doubled from 230 adopted laws in 
2003 to 453 laws in 2005.  
When analysing changes in the legal framework (rule adoption) it is not 
sufficient to look at the outcomes, i.e. how many laws were adopted or 
transplanted from abroad. The legislative process, i.e. how rules were adopted is 
                                                     
3 See http://lex.justice.md/md/331011/. 
4 See http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&id=312839. 
5 See http://lex.justice.md/md/331268/. 
6 See http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/436-15/ed20120524. 
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equally relevant, if not more. Unfortunately, external pressure for reforms and the 
zeal of domestic reformers (as well as competition between them) has resulted in 
a deficient rule-adoption process. Both in the Baltic States and EaP countries, fast-
track legislating in the parliament, decisions and presidential decrees were used to 
meet the EU’s (and other international donors’) reform demands (Bates, 2010; 
Stewart, 2016; Pettai and Madise, 2006). Legislating was typically done by 
empowered reformist elites from the executive and undermined, in many 
instances, the stability of law as well as the democratic rule adoption process 
(Sadurski, 2004; Goetz and Zubek, 2007; Mendelski, 2015). Only in Estonia has 
the legislative process been of higher quality, reflected in more stable and coherent 
legislation and a well-functioning regulatory impact analysis (Laffranque, 2009; 
Staronova, 2010)7. By contrast, Ukraine and Moldova had a fragmented legal 
drafting process which resulted in less coherent and unpredictable legislation 
(Lucas, 2015, p. 316). 
In sum, regime changes, the zeal for reform and legal approximation to 
European standards as well as domestic structural problems (e.g. state capture, 
fragmentation and low capacity of legal departments) have resulted in increased 
rule adoption and approximation, but also in legal instability, incoherence and lack 
of implementation8. The overall uneven development in terms of formal legality 
(which deteriorated) and substantive legality (which improved) reflects the mixed 
impact of the EU-driven reforms and a common dilemma for reformers: how to 
improve the substantive quality of (the rule of) law whilst not undermining its 
formal, procedural quality, i.e. its “inner morality”?  
 
3.3. Judicial quality: the EU strengthens judicial capacity but undermines 
judicial impartiality 
 
Figure 5 presents a selected indicator (judicial budget p.c.) to measure the 
development of judicial capacity in EaP countries and Baltic States. On the whole, 
considerable progress can be observed among both groups, suggesting a beneficial 
potential impact of EU-driven reforms. This positive trend in the judicial budget 
has been accompanied by increased computerization, automation (court 
management and information systems), increased training and partly also by more 
human resources. Alternative explanations certainly contributed to this positive 
trend, such as international donor conditionality, which focused on judicial 
capacity building as well as beneficial domestic economic conditions until 2008 
(interrupted only briefly by the international financial crisis).  
                                                     
7 Detailed reasons for the high quality of drafting and legislation can be found in the 
summary report Quality of Legislation: Estonian Perspectives, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
dgs/legal_service/seminars/estonia_summary.pdf. 
8 Confirmed by judges from Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. 
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Figure 5. Development of judicial capacity in post-Soviet states 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from CEPEJ 2004; 2006; 2008; 2010; 2012; 20149. 
 
In contrast to this very positive trend, judicial impartiality experienced a 
mostly stagnating development (Table 1). Judicial independence remained more 
or less at a similar level, slightly increasing in EaP countries and slightly 
decreasing in the Baltic States. Most countries did not improve their judicial 
independence ratings, with the exception of Georgia (+2) and Moldova (+2), 
which, however, remain in the median range. The indicator “Irregular payments 
in judicial decisions” from the World Economic Forums Executive Opinion 
Survey (WEFEOS), which can be used to indicate judicial corruption and 
problems with judicial accountability, suggests that EU-driven reforms were not 
transformative. For most countries, this indicator rather stagnated or decreased, 
with the exception of Georgia which considerably improved its rating (+2.3). 
Without this significant progress, the average value of the EaP group in 2012 
would have been only 2.5 (instead of 3.0). “Separation of powers” increased in 
the EaP group (+0.8) more than in the Baltic group (-0.3), which experienced a 
slight regression, admittedly from a very high level. “Prosecution of office abuse” 
(which is used here as a measure for accountability to the law) remained in both 
groups at a similar level. Overall, the lack of progress on the judicial impartiality 
dimension suggests that improving certain crucial values (judicial independence, 
accountability, integrity etc.) is a path-dependent and complex process, which is 
difficult to change in the short-term despite selective improvements (as occurred 
in the EaP countries). In sum, the EU’s impact was potentially uneven across the 
four key dimensions of the rule of law: while substantive legality and judicial 
                                                     
9 See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/. 
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capacity improved, formal legality and judicial impartiality did not. The reasons 
for this uneven development and the continuing divergence across the two groups 
of countries are explored in the next section. 
 
Table 1. Selected judicial impartiality indictors for post-Soviet states 
  
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
absolute 
change 
relative 
change in 
% 
Baltic states 
Judicial independence, 
BTI, Scale 1-10 
10.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 -1.0 -10.0 
Irregular payments in 
judicial decision,  
WEFEOS, scale from 1-7  
4.6 4.6 4.1 4.3 4.4 n/a -0.3 -6.9 
Separation of powers,  
BTI, Scale 1-10 
10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 9.7 9.7 -0.3 -3.3 
Prosecution of office abuse 
(accountability)  
BTI, Scale 1-10 
8.3 8.3 8.0 8 8 8 -0.3 -4.0 
EaP countries 
Judicial independence, 
BTI, Scale 1-10 
4.6 5.2 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.2 +0.6 +13.0 
Irregular payments in 
judicial decisions, 
WEFEOS, scale from 1-7 
3.7 3.6 3.1 2.8 3.0 n/a -0.7 -18.6 
Separation of powers, 
BTI, scale 1-10 
4.8 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.6 +0.8 +16.7 
Prosecution of office abuse 
(accountability), 
BTI, scale 1-10 
5 5.2 5 5 5 5 0.0 -3.8 
Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI); World Economic Forums Executive 
Opinion Survey (WEFEOS). 
 
4. Explanation: what accounts for the divergence in EaP and Baltic states?  
 
Differences in rule of law development have been explained by a mixture 
of domestic (e.g. historical legacies) and external factors (e.g. presence of external 
conditionality) (see Dallara, 2014; Mendelski, 2009, 2014). The puzzling question 
for the post-Soviet region is then why have similar historical legacies (communist 
rule during the Soviet Union) and similar pressure for rule of law reform by the 
EU resulted in divergent trends in the rule of law (and in particular in formal 
legality and judicial impartiality)? In particular, why were (EU-driven) rule of law 
reforms more effective (less pathological) in the Baltic States than in EaP 
countries? My main argument resorts to a chain of causally linked domestic and 
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external factors which reinforce each other in a circular and cumulative way 
(Myrdal, 1957), creating negative dynamics, and a vicious reform cycle. The 
vicious circle explains development in most laggard EaP countries and reflects the 
circular reinforcement between structure, domestic and external agency and the 
reform process: (1) Social heterogeneity/fragmentation (historical, regional, 
ethnic and ideological fractionalization, divided society)  (2) Divided domestic 
elites (reformers)  (3) Detrimental political competition between EU and 
Russia-oriented elites  (4) Partisan empowerment of domestic elites through EU 
conditionality (and Russian conditionality)  (5) Reinforcement of reform 
pathologies (instrumentalization of law, politicization of state structures)  (6) 
Lack of impartiality (including neutral and unitary accountability structures) and 
formal legality imply a lack of the rule of law  (1) Political and societal conflicts 
(divided state and society). 
(1) Social heterogeneity/fragmentation is not solely related to ethnic 
fractionalization (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg, 
2003), which seems, at first sight, considerably high in most post-Soviet states.10 
Rather, this concept also includes other potential “dividing factors” among 
members of a society, such as socio-economic, historical, regional, cultural and 
ideological ones (e.g. pro-Western, pro-Russian). The set of dividing factors may 
also shift in time as the mobilization of heterogeneous groups varies with the 
change of legal, political, economic and geopolitical conditions that may alter the 
opportunity structure for certain groups and their representatives (e.g. integration 
into Euro-Atlantic or Eurasian structures, changing ratios between minorities due 
to emigration etc.). Furthermore, the distinct social dividing factors may be 
differently linked to the organization of the state and the economy. Access to 
political, legal and economic positions (and thus to power, status and capital) may 
be conditioned on ethnicity, kinship, political and ideological orientation, or 
regional factors. In addition, the nature of dividing boundaries may differ. For 
instance, ethno-national and linguistic dividing social factors may be reflected in 
a sharp, factional organization of the state (as in Latvia and Estonia) or may be 
blurred and permeable as in Ukraine and Moldova (Brubaker, 2011)11. 
Social heterogeneity and pluralism are not bad per se and do not have to 
result in the fragmentation of the state and society, including increased conflicts 
                                                     
10 The considerable percentage of Russian and Russian-speaking minorities in post-Soviet 
States is reflected in the relatively high ethnic fractionalization scores of Latvia (0.58), 
Estonia (0.50), Moldova (0.55), Georgia (0.49), Lithuania (0.32), Ukraine (0.47), 
Azerbaijan 0.2), Armenia (0.13). The higher the score, the more ethnically fractionalized 
the society. See Alesina et al 2003.  
11 In Ukraine, “Political struggles over nationalizing policies have been articulated along 
regional and linguistic rather than ethnonational group lines; they have been intertwined 
with geopolitical and geoeconomic questions concerning the relations of Ukraine with 
Russia, on the one hand, and the EU, on the other.” (Brubaker, 2011, p. 1806). 
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among societal/political groups (Lijphart, 1977). However, tensions and conflicts 
may arise when powerful domestic elites attempt to capture the state and state 
laws during reforms to promote the interests of one dominant group. In such 
situations, the law and state structures may be misused as a “political weapon” 
(Maravall, 2003). This tendency to undermine the rule of law through competing 
political elites may be higher in “divided societies” (Way, 2015a) or “cleft 
countries” (such as Moldova and Ukraine), i.e. countries which exhibit 
considerable historical, regional and political divisions (Katchanovski, 2006). 
Similar political struggles and misuse of the rule of law were discovered in the 
instable and heterogeneous Western Balkans (Mendelski, 2015). Interestingly, 
however, the considerable fractionalized “ethnic democracies”, Latvia and 
Estonia, have been better able to regulate conflict inside the state (Smith, 1996). 
By partially excluding Russian minorities (and external Russian influence), they 
were able to mitigate detrimental political competition and fragmentation of the 
polity, which provided a basis for the rule of law. I will elaborate in more detail 
on this process below, but first, let me turn to the EaP countries and show how 
their fractionalized social structure has translated into divided domestic elites. 
(2) Divided elites: Elites in EaP countries have been characterized as 
disunited, divided or fragmented (Higley, Bayulgen and George, 2003; Higley and 
Burton, 2006; Way, 2015a). The strong division of domestic elites in EaP 
countries is for instance reflected in the lack of a consensus on the general goals 
of development and transformation. The BTI “consensus on goals” indicator, 
which measures the extent to which “the major political actors agree on 
democracy and a market economy as strategic, long-term goals” suggests that 
domestic elites have been much more divided and conflictual in the EaP region 
(which are assessed with 5.5, a score in the median range), in comparison to the 
more united political elites in the Baltic States which obtained a relatively high 
average value of 9.0 for the period 2004-2014, on a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 
(best). In his analysis of anti-corruption reform effectiveness, Kupatadze argues 
that “Successful reform effort in Estonia hence was led by a structurally- and 
ideologically-cohesive, integrated, and young political elite lacking a communist 
background. This guaranteed consensus over goals…” (Kupatadze, 2016, p. 16). 
By contrast, the lower elite cohesiveness in the EaP countries (especially in 
Ukraine, Moldova and partially also in Georgia), which was rooted in the 
polarization over core values and national identity (Way, 2015a), resulted in more 
frequent power struggles and harmful political competition over reforms and 
geopolitical orientation.  
(3) Political competition is seen by some authors as beneficial, because it 
provides a guarantee and constraint on the governing parties, resulting in more 
independent judiciaries, constitutional courts and other oversight institutions 
(Grzymala-Busse, 2007; Ginsburg, 2003; Morlino and Sadurski, 2010). However, 
under certain conditions (e.g. of social fragmentation, weak institutional 
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constraints, geopolitical in-betweenness etc.), political competition can turn into 
detrimental political competition,12 affecting judicial independence negatively. 
Maria Popova has argued (and shown) that in hybrid regimes (semi-authoritarian 
regimes and defective democracies), “competition has the exact opposite effect on 
judicial independence that it purportedly has in consolidated democracies: it 
hinders rather than promotes the maintenance of independent courts...The 
consequences are the politicization of justice, the subordination of the courts to 
the executive, and the failure of the rule of law project.” (Popova, 2012, p. 3).  
Intensified and detrimental political competition has been regularly 
observed in the EaP region (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia), where pro-Western and 
pro-Russia (or nationally-oriented) oligarchs have engaged in harmful power 
struggles. These countries also experienced “revolutionary coup d’etats” 
(coloured revolutions) (Lane, 2010) which were followed by erratic reforms and 
counter-movements. Azerbaijan and Armenia, by contrast, avoided this kind of 
excessive instability and fragmentation, and turned into more authoritarian 
regimes that abused the rule of law. Thus, both too much centralization and too 
much fragmentation had pathological consequences the rule of law. Why? Under 
authoritarian regimes (Azerbaijan, Armenia), unchecked governments and 
presidents were able to instrumentalize externally-demanded rule of law reforms 
by centralizing control over the prosecution and anti-corruption structures. The 
empowered executive and presidential administration was then able to discipline 
political rivals and consolidate power (Börzel and Pamuk, 2012, p. 89). In more 
competitive and pluralistic political systems (Ukraine, Moldova), rival domestic 
political elites have instrumentalized the law (Lucas, 2015) and state structures 
(the prosecution, the judiciary, horizontal accountability institutions and 
regulatory agencies), thus transforming them into “political weapons” (Maravall, 
2003) in struggles for power, influence and capital. Judicial and accountability 
structures therefore became polarized and fragmented in nature. They have learnt 
to shift their loyalties and to calculate strategically as a result of political pressure 
and intimidation. Thus, in EAP countries, horizontal accountability structures 
(e.g. Constitutional courts, Ombudsmen, judiciary) never acquired the necessary 
unity, independence and capacity as analogous oversight institutions in the Baltic 
States. In Ukraine (as well as in Moldova), weak and politicized constitutional 
courts were paralysed by the political struggles of competing oligarchs (Marlino 
and Sadurski, 2010, p. 191). Judges have often chosen a “strategy of survival” in 
an instable, competitive social and political environment in which “everything can 
be negotiated” through political deals, clientelism and corruption (Natorski, 2013, 
p. 365). This survival strategy of judges became even more necessary after the 
                                                     
12 This qualitatively lower political competition, which Lucan Way calls “pluralism by 
default“, is the consequence “…of a fragmented and polarized elite and weak state unable 
to monopolize political control” (Way, 2003, p. 463).  
126  |  Martin MENDELSKI 
 
Eastern Journal of European Studies | 2016 - volume 7(2) | wwww.ejes.uaic.ro | ISSN: 2068-6633 | CC BY 
violent events from the Euromaidan when intimidation and violent attacks on 
judges increased13.  
In Ukraine (but also in Moldova and partly in Georgia), detrimental 
political competition resulted in frequent reforms and counter-reforms and 
(re)negotiation of constitutional arrangements (Fisun, 2016) to be able to preserve 
power and control over judicial and prosecutorial institutions. Petrov and Serdyuk 
argued that “The judiciary in Ukraine has been used to protect and promote 
political interests and objectives of both change agents and veto players” (Petrov 
and Serdyuk, 2009, p. 206), an important observation which shows that 
independently of who is in power, old governing practices die hard.14 This 
persistence of former governance habits (including the resort to clientelistic and 
informal practices) can also be observed in Moldova (see Mendelski, 2014). State 
capture (Hellman et al., 2003), that is “the efforts of firms to shape the laws, 
policies, and regulations of the state to their own advantage by providing illicit 
private gains to public officials”,15 has become a persistent phenomenon in 
countries where competing oligarchs instrumentalized state institutions for their 
particularistic interests (Tudoroiu, 2015; Kupatadze, 2009). Law and 
accountability structures, which in the consolidated Baltic democracies function 
as constraints, became instruments in the hands of powerful party leaders, who 
were able to accumulate more unconstrained power. What about foreign checks 
on domestic reformers? This issue is addressed next. 
(4) The partisan empowerment of pro-Western elites (in Ukraine, Moldova, 
Georgia) by EU and US representatives, on the one hand, and Russia’s support of 
Eastern-oriented domestic elites, on the other hand, exacerbated detrimental 
political competition, intensified political (and violent) conflicts and societal 
divisions. Potential foreign accountability mechanisms, such as EU conditionality, 
which could have disciplined domestic oligarchs, became inconsistent, selective 
and ineffective (Schimmelfennig, 2015; Börzel and Van Hüllen, 2014; Kubicek, 
2016). To counter Russia’s geopolitical influence in the region, the EU (as well as 
the US) empowered and supported the most powerful “change agents”, no matter 
how undemocratically they behaved (Mendelski. 2016). Giving reform ownership 
to domestic elites with vested interests (such as pro-European oligarchs in 
                                                     
13 See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ccje/textes/OP18_Ukraine.pdf.; http://www. 
coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ccje/textes/CCJE_GT_2015_4E.asp; http://www.coe.int/t/dg 
hl/cooperation/ccje/Cooperation/Comments_Ukraine_May_2015.pdf. 
14 The statement of Vadim Cherny, an Odessa businessman is telling: “Yanukovych’s 
people thought they would be around for years to come, so they would come and tell you 
they want half the company…. These new guys view themselves as transitory, so they try 
to steal as much money as possible from you in cash. They haven’t got rid of corruption; 
they have just changed its form.” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/ 
25/mikheil-saakashvili-ukraine-government-has-no-vision-for-reform-odessa. 
15 See https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm. 
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Moldova and Ukraine, authoritarian leaders in Caucasus countries) (Börzel and 
Pamuk, 2012) can be highly problematic for establishing the rule of law. Change 
agents in weak rule of law countries often lack the appropriate incentives, norms 
and skills to conduct reforms in a non-politicised, inclusive and long-term oriented 
way. Instead of respecting the rule of law, many of the EU’s reformist change 
agents from the EaP states, have (mis)used the law and the judicial system as a 
weapon against their political and economic competitors who, once in power, 
behaved in a similar way (Popova, 2012; Börzel and Pamuk, 2012; Natorski, 
2013; Burlyuk, 2015; Mendelski, 2015). The results of these domestic power 
struggles are vicious cycles of reform and counter-reform with detrimental effects 
for the rule of law and, in particular, for legal stability, judicial independence and 
accountability. By empowering questionable and unaccountable pro-EU elites 
(e.g. Shaakasvili in Georgia, Filat and Plahotniuc in Moldova, Poroshenko, 
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko in Ukraine) and by giving them a free hand in 
conducting reforms without the necessary restrictions has created new 
possibilities of abuse of power and of rule of law reform. Reforms and support of 
pro-Western change agents do not automatically mean progress, especially under 
unfavourable conditions with insufficient institutional or democratic checks to 
control reformers (see Mendelski, 2015; 2016). 
A telling example of the EU’s partisan empowerment strategy with 
pathological consequences for the rule of law comes from Moldova (see 
Mendelski 2016). Here, the EU has supported reformist “change agents” from 
the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) who undermined the rule of law in 
practice. Transgressions of the rule of law of reformist Moldovan change agents 
were reflected in politicization, division,16 and state capture (Tudoroiu, 2015), as 
well as in several criminal scandals that were related to the abuse of the rule of law 
(e.g. “Padurea domneasca”, theft of one billion USD), misuse of courts in 
corruption scandals and “raider attacks” (fraudulent take-overs of companies and 
banks), and non-registration (elimination) of the main political competitor (the 
Patria party, led by Renato Usati), allegedly through pressure on the Central 
Election Committee and arbitrary justice17. 
The EU’s tacit and active support (in particular the Commission and the EU 
delegation) contributed to this pathological development (Mendelski, 2016). 
Despite the instrumentalization of reforms and judicial structures, EU, US and IMF 
representatives continued to meet and support questionable reformist leaders (pro-
                                                     
16 The division of state structures among AEI leaders was documented in a secret appendix 
to the official alliance contract forming the political alliance.  
17 While the chief of the EC delegation in Chisinau expressed “deep concern” about the 
exclusion of the Patria party three days before the election, the EU’s progress report from 
2015 assessed this apparent abuse as a “deregistration”, without any further comments. 
See http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/world/2121-moldova-eu-integration-at-all-costs and 
https://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2015/repulic-of-moldova-enp-report-2015_en.pdf. 
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Western oligarchs) from the AEI, for instance, former Prime Minister Vlad Filat 
(who was recently sentenced to 9 years of prison) and the controversial 
businessman and former first Deputy Speaker of the Parliament of Moldova, Vlad 
Plahotniuc18. According to my interview with a representative of the EU 
delegation, the EU granted and prolonged “honeymoon” periods. These were 
transitory periods after the regime change in 2009 during which leaders from the 
Alliance for European Integration (AIE) had free rein to bolster their power, 
which, however, turned some years later into too much unchecked power and 
abuse. The partisan support by the West of reformist AIE leaders was reflected, 
for instance, in the official meetings and support from EU and US 
representatives,19 as well as in very close personal relations with EU and US 
diplomats,20 allowing them to obtain a carte blanche or “deal among friends” (see 
Belloni and Strazzari, 2014). This, in turn, reduced accountability and opened up 
possibilities of undermining the objective assessment and promotion of the rule of 
law, as well as the fight against corruption. By praising the reform “success story” 
of the AIE, the EU has supported a pro-EU reformist group that used 
questionable means of governing and reforming and that experienced shrinking 
legitimacy and public support21. As a consequence, Moldova’s “success story” has 
turned into the “EU’s failed success story”, or a “story of failure for the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership”, as admitted even by liberal voices such as Kalman Mizsei 
and Armand Gosu22.  
Partisan empowerment by the EU and the US was also practiced in Georgia 
after the Rose revolution in 2003. The new president Saakashvili, a US-educated 
lawyer, launched a zero tolerance policy towards crime and corruption which was 
hailed by the World Bank and liberal representatives in EU institutions as a 
constructed “success story” (Di Puppo, 2014) which hardly deserved this label.23 
Externally-driven reforms aimed, among other things, to liberalize the legal and 
judicial system by transplanting common law elements (e.g. plea bargaining). This 
reorientation of a predominantly continental legal system which, up to 2003, had 
been built through the collaboration between German and Georgian judges and 
with the help of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
                                                     
18 See http://www.trm.md/en/politic/premierul-vlad-filat-in-vizita-de-lucru-la-bruxelles/. 
19 See http://inprofunzime.md/stiri/politic/tot-mai-des-in-public-vlad-plahotniuc-a-parti 
cipat-la-receptia.html; http://www.trm.md/ro/politic/premierul-vlad-filat-in-vizita-de-luc 
ru-la-bruxelles/; http://www.romania.mfa.md/news/482405/; http://www.europalibera. 
org/a/24413712.html. 
20 Interview with a former advisor to the government of Moldova. 
21 Interview with Moldovan judges and civil society representatives, Chisinau 2011. 
22 See http://www.moldova.org/en/moldova-eus-failed-success-story/; http://www.hotnews 
.ro/stiri-opinii-20709654-analiza-republica-moldova-cosmarul-continua.htm. See also 
Kostanyan, 2016. 
23 Interview with an international legal advisor to Georgia. 
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(GIZ), became eroded and fragmentized when new, US-trained young judges and 
prosecutors were appointed in key positions and promoted the introduction of 
common law institutions.24 For instance, the new “legal transplant” of “plea 
bargaining” (which was introduced to support the fight against corruption), turned 
into a “legal irritant” which did not function as intended (Alkon, 2010). Instead of 
improving justice, plea bargaining strengthened the role of prosecutors, increased 
incentives for torture and degrading treatment and turned into a means of extorting 
money from (wealthy, high profile) defendants who were forced to pay large sums 
to avoid torture and criminal conviction (Reichelt, 2004)25. The deficient application 
of plea bargaining also undermined the impartiality of the judicial system because 
solvent defendants received a more lenient punishment than insolvent ones. This 
lead former Supreme Court judge Tamara Laliashvili to conclude that plea 
bargaining, which has been introduced by reformers to fight corruption, has 
developed into a “corrupt institution” itself (Laliashvili, 2013, p. 240).  
Given that the glorified fight against corruption and crime in Georgia under 
Saakashvili was subject to selectivity, abuse and politicization (Di Puppo, 2010; 
Beselia, 2013), to disciplinary proceedings26 and dismissal of judges who refused 
to be docile executors (Laliashvili, 2013),27 and an increase of prisoners by 
approx. 400% between 2003 and 2011 (including several hundred of political 
prisoners and incidents of torture) (Beselia, 2013), it is perplexing that this abusive 
reform policy has been tacitly backed by liberal US and EU representatives (as 
well as by the World Bank and numerous NGOs), who supported the authoritarian 
change agent openly. Thus, Georgia’s “escape” from Soviet legacy through 
Europeanization (Kupatadze, 2012, p. 30) and particularly the fight against 
corruption was at best a partial success (in terms of outcomes) with severe 
limitations of the reform process28. 
Is there a systematic failure of the EaP due to partisan empowerment of 
questionable, pro-Western elites? Nowadays, there is more and more evidence that 
                                                     
24 Telephone interview with a former high ranking judges from Georgia. 
25 By 2006, the Georgian State had recouped approx. 50 to 60 million USD through plea 
bargaining. The son in law of Ex-President Shevardnadze alone paid back 30 million USD. 
https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=11100&lang 
=en#P407_73546. 
26 See http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=11305. 
27 See https://jamestown.org/program/judges-allege-that-saakashvilis-team-is-purging-
georgias-judicial-bench/. 
28 In Ukraine, Shaakashvili was appointed governor with the task to “clean up Ukraine” 
of corruption and had to resign after several months in office due to resistance by domestic 
oligarchs, but also due to his erratic, selective and authoritarian reform style. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/opinion/why-ukraine-is-losing-the-war-on-
corruption.html; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/25/mikheil-saakashvili-
ukraine-government-has-no-vision-for-reform-odessa. 
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the so-called “successful cases” Georgia (under Saakashvili), Moldova (under the 
Alliance for European Integration) and Ukraine (under pro-Western oligarchs) 
were unsuccessful cases in which empowered pro-Western reformers abused their 
power and undermined the rule of law. This failure is reflected in a plethora of 
scandals and abuses of power on which the EU (and the US) has turned a blind 
eye: (1) the billion dollar theft and 20 billion money laundering scandal in 
Moldova under the AIE; (2) the dismissal of constitutional judges, prosecutors, 
police, through a controversial lustration law in Ukraine and the violent attacks 
and selective prosecution of judges, journalists and opposition members after the 
Euromaidan (Katchanovski, 2016); (3) the banning of opposition parties (Patria 
party in Moldova and communist party in Ukraine); (4) the embezzling of foreign 
(IMF) funds in Ukraine and individual corruption scandals of pro-Western 
oligarchs (in Moldova and Ukraine) (Kudelia, 2016); (5) the authoritarian and 
politicized fight against corruption/crime in Georgia under Saakashvili (including 
selective prosecution, abusive plea bargaining deals, torture scandals etc.). All 
these incidents reflect the pathological consequences of previous politicization 
and concentration of power in the hands of empowered pro-Western elites. Rather 
than preventing these abusive practices, the EU’s positive and partisan assessment 
and support of change agents and its weakening of the opposition (as actors of 
oversight), has actually opened the way for abuse of power, including the 
instrumentalization of law, state structures and oversight institutions (see Börzel 
and Pamuk, 2012; Burlyuk, 2015; Tudoroiu, 2015; Kuzio, 2016a; Mendelski, 
2016). 
(5) As a consequence, partisan empowerment and assessment by the EU 
has resulted in the reinforcement of several reform pathologies of 
Europeanization:  
1. Detrimental political competition has reinforced politicization and 
polarization of the judiciary and accountability structures (e.g. Constitutional 
Court), which were not able to act as neutral enforcement and oversight parties. 
This opened up possibilities for political abuse and resulted in a lower level of 
judicial impartiality.  
2. Formal legality (stability, coherence, generality and enforcement of law) has 
been weakened by detrimental political competition between opposing and 
empowered reformist (pro-Western) and anti-reformist, Russian-oriented 
factions (oligarchs) which instrumentalized law to propagate the interests of 
their supporters from abroad. This domestic struggle for power (fuelled by 
external conditionality) has increased political instability, polarization, 
fragmentation of the legislating process and of the legal framework (Lucas, 
2015). The EU’s (and other donors’) constant pressure for reforms and insistence 
on quantitative “track records” (outputs) has reinforced legal instability. The 
unintended pathological results of quantitative incentives were speedy and ad-
hoc, legislating without a democratic, domestically legitimate debate. In 
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addition, the diverse backgrounds, agendas and priorities of external donors 
produced a fragmented and incoherent version of legal pluralism, with all its 
pathological effects for the functioning of the judicial system and business.  
The process of legal fragmentation (incoherence) can be portrayed in the 
example of private law in Ukraine which has evolved into a dual and fragmented 
structure (due to historical and more recent geopolitical and political divisions) 
(Logush, 2011). The dual structure of private law basically means that similar 
issues are regulated by two different and incompatible codes: 1. the Western-
modeled Civil Code of Ukraine and 2. the traditional Russian-inspired, Economic 
Code of Ukraine. This means in practice that judges from Western Ukraine tend 
to utilize the Civil Code (including Western-inspired manuals for interpretation), 
whereas judges in Eastern Ukraine make predominant use of the Economic 
Code.29 Ukraine’s dual nature of law and its non-unitary and parallel application 
has in turn produced conflict, duplication, contradictions (Shishkin and 
Drobyshev, 2007) and “serious difficulties in everyday legal practice” (Hoffmann, 
2016). Rather than creating a unified Code, the dual and fragmented nature of 
private law is maintained and propagated by two different legal and political 
factions which cannot agree on a unified Code. This is lack of consensus and the 
polarization of domestic actors is exacerbated by partisan support and pressure 
from the West (US-Ukraine Business Council, OECD), which advocates for the 
abolishment of the Economic Code30, and by Russia which tends to defend it.  
Finally, the identified pathologies should not only be seen as short-term, 
temporary side-effects of externally and executive-driven judicial and legal 
reforms, but as long-term, systemic pathologies that are repeated in every new 
wave of reform by reformist change agents and anti-reformist veto players. Thus, 
by going through several waves of reform and counter-reform, the fragmented and 
instable structure of the polity, the economy and law (structural heterogeneity) 
becomes preserved as a systemic deficiency. 
(6) Overall, many crucial aspects of the rule of law have not been improved 
in the EaP region. EU-driven judicial and anti-corruption reforms did not bring 
the rule of law. The backing of unaccountable reformers resulted in some selective 
positive but mainly pathological consequences. The domestic struggles over 
(politicized) reforms intensified political and societal conflicts and reinforced the 
fragmentation of the polity, society and economy. Thus, externally-driven reforms 
                                                     
29 In Georgia (as well as in the Baltic States), this fragmentation of law and division of 
magistrates was initially avoided by replacing Soviet–inspired legal literature through 
Western and in particular German legal textbooks. However, a new generation of 
Americanized politicians, legal scholars and judges who promoted the common law 
system after the Rose Revolution and eroded German-inspired continental law reinforced 
legal pluralism and fragmentation. Interview with a former high-ranking Georgian judge. 
30 See http://www.usubc.org/files/White_Paper_Nov_18_15_ENG(1).pdf. 
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were not transformative. They have accentuated divisions and reproduced a 
fragmented and instable social order.  
What remains to be explained is how the Baltic States avoided this 
detrimental vicious cycle and why some of them (especially Estonia) even 
produced a virtuous reform cycle that consolidated the rule of law? This better 
outcome is puzzling, as structural and historical preconditions were similar. Both 
groups of countries were part of the Soviet Union and thus affected by the 
communist legacy (Jowitt, 1992; Ekiert and Hanson, 2003). Both, the EaP and the 
Baltic states show considerable social and particularly ethnic fragmentation, 
which is even higher in Estonia and Latvia (approx. 25-30 % are ethnic Russians) 
than in most EaP countries. How did the Baltic States overcome detrimental 
political competition and fragmentation including its pathological consequences 
for the rule of law? The answer is unorthodox and goes against the popular liberal 
view of according minorities their political rights, thus being consistent with the 
work of Carl Schmitt (Schmitt 1932) who argued that a unitary state can (and 
should) be created (through the mobilization against an enemy) to overcome 
pluralist fragmentation and abuse of the pluralist party system. 
Indeed, all three Baltic states managed to create stable, unitary states (in 
contrast to more fragmented and weak states in EaP countries), although strategies 
varied. On the one hand, Lithuania managed to build a relatively coherent and 
unitary state without excluding minorities. The state-building process was 
facilitated by its relatively homogenous nation, which included only a relatively 
small Russian minority (8.7% in 1993) which was granted full citizenship (Steen 
2000). On the other hand, Estonia and Latvia achieved political unity and 
overcame ethnicity-based fractionalization, by pursuing a nationalistic, anti-
communist, anti-Soviet strategy (“the enemy”) which resulted in a high degree of 
elite replacement after the fall of communism (see Kalnins, 2015) and an 
exclusion of ethnic Russians and non-citizens from politics and state institutions 
(including the civil service, judiciary, prosecution etc.) (see ECRI, 2008, p. 33). 
Anton Steen, who has analysed the proportion of minorities represented in the 
parliament and the public sector, reports the following figures for the Baltic States 
in the 1990s: 
In the state bureaucracy and judiciary, the indigenous elite has an 
overwhelming majority in all three countries, standing at between 90 and 100 per 
cent in 1993-94 and 1997. Regarding the basic democratic institution, in Estonia 
no Russians were elected to the first parliament, while five Russians out of 101 
deputies were elected to the second parliament. In the Latvian parliament (the 
Supreme Council) elected in 1990, 28 per cent were Russophones (22 per cent 
ethnic Russians). The first ordinary parliament elected in 1993 had 12 
nonindigenous deputies out of 100; in the next parliament, elected in 1995, the 
number decreased to eight, among whom five were ethnic Russians. In Lithuania’s 
first parliament, elected in 1992, among 141 representatives there were three 
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Russians and seven Poles, amounting to eight per cent of the deputies (Steen, 
2000, p. 74). 
More recent data from Latvia and Estonia, my personal interview with an 
ethnic Russian judge from Latvia and several estimates indicate that the Russian 
minority continues to be underrepresented in almost all ministries (except the 
ministry of interior), the parliament, civil service, prosecution and the judiciary. 
In Latvia, for instance, out of 307 judges, only 18 (i.e. 5.9%) were Russians in 
2001. A similar figure was reported for the Ministry of Justice (Pabriks, 2002). In 
2008, approx. 12 % of all judges and 6 % of all prosecutors were non-Latvian 
(Buzayev, 2013, p. 143). Similarly low figures were reported for Estonia in 2001 
(Open Society Institute 2002, p. 233). How could this disproportionality be 
explained and what about its effects? 
The overrepresentation of indigenous elites inside the state can be attributed 
(among others) to a unifying nationalist strategy of “ethnic control” in Estonia and 
Latvia (Pettai and Hallik, 2002). This national ideology of “partial exclusion”, 
which restricted in practice the fundamental rights (including the right to vote31) 
of many ethnic Russians through restrictive citizenship legislation from 1992 
(Steen, 2010), which put the Russian parties in “eternal opposition”, had (next to 
multiple negative) one main positive effect: it avoided detrimental political 
competition (Pettai, 2005) and limited the EU’s and Russia’s “fractionalization 
power”32. Hence, politicization, partisan empowerment and misuse of state 
structures by rival elites have been mostly avoided. The beneficial consequences 
were a more independent, unitary and accountable judiciary, prosecution and 
horizontal accountability structures (e.g. Constitutional Courts, Ombudsmen), 
which could in turn check the (potentially abusive) reformers from the executive, 
however not in an activist but more restrained way. The ensuing system of 
multiple mutual checks & balances opened up the way for non-politicized judicial 
and anti-corruption reforms and a steady and unipolar orientation towards the 
West, in contrast to the bipolar and erratic orientation of the EaP countries 
(Dragneva-Lewers and Wolczuk, 2015). In addition, there was also less 
instrumentalization of the law and the reform pathology of legal instability and 
incoherence was mostly avoided. Finally, coherent and steady political, legal and 
economic reforms in one direction were facilitated. Pettai argued that:  
“Estonia would have never been able to adopt such decisive political and 
economic reform in the early 1990s if power had not been so 
                                                     
31 Pettai notes that “The first Riigikogu to be elected in 1992 was 100 percent ethnic 
Estonian, even though the population at large was only some 62 percent Estonian” (Pettai, 
2005, p. 28). 
32 Note that in contrast to the unity of Estonians, the citizenship law from 1993 (new Aliens 
law) fragmented Russian-speaking people into Estonian citizens, Russian Federation 
citizens and stateless persons (Pettai and Hallik, 2002, p. 514). 
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disproportionately in ethnic Estonian hands. Had Russian minority 
presence in Estonian politics been greater, there would have inevitably been 
more pressure to retain economic and political links with Russia…The aim 
to remove Estonia once and for all from Moscow’s shadow would have 
been a dream. Rather, Estonia might well have ended up more like 
Moldova, wracked by inter-ethnic tension and caught in an ambiguous 
geopolitical gray zone.” (Pettai, 2005, p. 29; Pettai and Hallik, 2002). 
In EaP countries (above all, in Moldova and Ukraine), the in-betweenness 
and oscillation between the East and West (Korosteleva, 2016; Kuzio, 2016b) and 
the empowerment strategies of the EU and Russia’s “managed policy of 
(in)stability” (Tolstrup, 2009) have produced divided domestic actors who 
pursued erratic political and rule of law reforms with pathological consequences 
for political stability, the rule of law, as well as the unity and strength of the state 
and society. Thus, by excluding a relatively large minority from political 
participation and representation in state structures, the Baltic States managed to 
overcome political fractionalization (Pettai, 2005) and factional organization 
despite their ethnic heterogeneity. The political leadership was thus able to 
mitigate polarizing conflicts inside the state and to establish political unity, which 
was followed by a consensus on EU and westward integration (i.e. in one 
direction).33 This national unity and unipolar orientation avoided the polarizing 
and fractionalizing power of competing hegemons (EU, Russia) and facilitated the 
creation of the rule of law. In the words of Herbert Spencer, the Baltic States 
transitioned from “an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity toward a definite, 
coherent heterogeneity; through continuous differentiations and integrations” 
(Herbert, 1862, p. 216). They were able to build a consolidated and integrated 
state through partial exclusion and control34.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The aim of the article was twofold: (1) To trace back empirically the impact 
of EU-driven reforms on rule of law development in post-Soviet states and (2) To 
explain rule of law divergence (including EU conditionality effectiveness) 
between the more advanced Baltic States and the laggard EaP countries. The 
findings suggest that the EU (together with the help of domestic reformers and 
international donors) had a positive impact on substantive legality (alignment of 
                                                     
33 This better mitigation of ethnic conflicts in the Baltic States (in comparison to EaP 
countries) is reflected in the higher scores on the BTI Cleavage/conflict management 
indicator. 
34 How this relatively successful transition occurred has been subject to an international 
research project on anti-corruption (Kalnins and Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015; Kalnins, 2015; 
Kasemets, 2012). 
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legislation to international standards) and judicial capacity which increased, but 
undermined the inner morality of law (legal instability) and judicial impartiality. 
Rule of law divergence (and, in particular, the pathological effects of EU-driven 
reforms in the EAP countries) was explained through a vicious reform cycle in 
which structure, agency and the reform process reinforce each other in a circular 
way. In particular, I argued that social (structural) and ideological heterogeneity 
(in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia) has produced divided and competing political 
actors (and fragmented state structures) which have instrumentalized legal, anti-
corruption and judicial reforms (politicized the judicial system and accountability 
institutions) to defend their particular interests and those of their supporters from 
abroad. The partisan empowerment of these pro-Western reformers by the EU 
(and US) has resulted in the accumulation of misuse of power, numerous 
corruption scandals, the reinforcement of reform pathologies and in the overall 
undermining of the rule of law.  
The Baltic States (in particular Estonia and Latvia) have escaped most of 
this kind of detrimental political competition and externally-reinforced divisions 
(by Russia and the EU) by creating a unitary, strong and coherent state (including 
independent judiciary) through the partial exclusion of ethnic Russians and their 
representatives from politics and state structures. This was done by a restrictive 
citizenship law which, among others, left a sizeable number of ethnic Russians 
stateless and constrained their rights to vote and to work in the civil service. This 
restriction of minority rights in Latvia and Estonia isolated the Russian-speaking 
minority from the polity, avoided legislative fractionalization and has, in turn, 
resulted in more united political elites. This consensual national political elite was 
then able to pursue a unipolar orientation (initially national, then European) which 
had one common vision (and not two as in most other post-Soviet countries). The 
absence of detrimental competition also allowed the creation of unified judicial 
and accountability structures which avoided being (mis)used as political 
instruments between different factions and could thus serve as constraints on 
reformers. As a consequence, the legal, political and judicial system in the Baltic 
States became more stable, coherent and functional. This contrasts with the 
bipolar aspirations (towards the West and Russia) of divided elites in EaP 
countries who seized reforms and state structures to advance their particular 
interests (and geopolitical interests of their foreign hegemonic powers). The 
politicized and erratic reform process (coupled with partisan external support) 
reduced accountability and the stability and coherence of law and state structures. 
Finally, a caveat must be acknowledged. The article did not deal with Russia’s 
cross-conditionality and its impact on the rule of law. Future research should 
therefore explore Russia’s influence (Tolstrup, 2014; Delcour and Wolczuk, 2015; 
Way, 2015b), including Russia’s impact on the fragmentation of state structures, 
its partisan empowerment of domestic elites and the abuse of the rule of law by 
pro-Eastern oligarchs (Burlyuk, 2015; Popova, 2012; Kuzio, 2016b).  
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What implications does the study have for EU and domestic reformers? 
First of all, the examples of “ethnic democracies” (Estonia and Latvia) show that 
creating the rule of law may require sometimes unorthodox, non-liberal strategies, 
such as (1) building a unitary state by opposing a common enemy and (2) creating 
coherent and capable political and legal structures through the restriction of access 
to the polity of certain groups (minorities) with different political-economic ties, 
goals and interests. This strategy of partial exclusion creates (under certain 
circumstances) the necessary social identity and unity for a strong state (able to 
exert political control). A more unified state, without divided elites is then more 
able to avoid detrimental political competition, which is beneficial for the 
establishment of many aspects of the rule of law (except those of certain political 
rights). Thus, the transition towards the rule of law (understood mainly as formal 
legality and judicial impartiality) may entail measures that are not compatible with 
a liberal, pluralist and “thick” rule of law notion35.  
This does not mean that reformers should restrict the political rights of 
minorities and their representatives. It might be that the “successful” (peaceful) 
strategy of partial exclusion of Russians (as applied in Latvia and Estonia) was 
only possible during a short window of (national, geopolitical and historical) 
“opportunity” after the collapse of communism, i.e. during a unique constellation 
of circumstances which may nowadays not be replicable in EaP countries. In fact, 
under different social, (geo-)political and economic conditions, strategies of 
partial exclusion (and orientation away or towards one external hegemon) can 
backfire and lead to tensions and even violent, secessionist conflicts (as occurred 
in Transnistria, Gagauzia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and more recently in 
Eastern Ukraine). The political elite in the Baltic States has avoided this violent 
outcome by offering their (Russian) minorities cultural rights as well as access to 
the (private) economic sector. Together with the relatively good economic 
development in the Baltic States (as compared to EaP States) the economic 
situation of minorities improved, assuring their acquiescence to exclusion from 
the polity.  
The way towards a more consociational model of democracy (Lijphhart, 
1977) based on a united and functioning state and the rule of law is however a 
challenging and gradual learning process. This transition process may require 
certain limits of alternatives, “beneficial checks” by accountability institutions on 
domestic and external reformers and adequate communication and cooperation 
structures that would be able to avoid the fragmentation of state structures and law 
and induce a more integrated political pluralism. I doubt that this transition 
                                                     
35 The reason is that a broader, more liberal concept of the rule of law (which stresses 
democratization/pluralization) may lead (in divided societies) to detrimental competition 
of polarized elites that undermine the coherence of law and state structures. The outcome 
is then a persisting vicious cycle between structural/societal fragmentation, elite 
fractionalization and fragmented “bad governance”. 
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process can be imposed from abroad by a strategy of partisan empowerment 
(especially if there are multiple competing hegemonic actors). Thus, I would 
advise the EU to become more consistent and non-partisan in its support and 
evaluation of governments. In particular, it should not grant “honeymoon periods” 
to pro-Western change agents after regimes changes (e.g. as in Moldova, Ukraine, 
or Georgia), particularly when they break or misuse the law, disrespect human 
rights, engage in corruption or instrumentalize anti-corruption and judicial 
reforms. Rather than focusing on regime change and a few selected liberal change 
agents, the EU should reward reformers who apply an impartial, depoliticised and 
inclusive reform approach, who foster domestic consensus and regard the law as 
a necessary constraint rather than a tool. While a rethinking of Western rule of law 
promotion is desirable, it is doubtful whether it is feasible under the current 
geopolitical circumstances. Do we have alternatives to the current strategy of rule 
of law promotion? 
Instead of applying a fractionalizing strategy of partisan empowerment or 
risky partial exclusion, there is an alternative path towards the rule of law: A 
reform strategy of national political unity (absence of detrimental competition 
between elites) which would then potentially translate into a unitary, independent 
and impartial judiciary and non-fragmented, stable and impartially enforced rules. 
However, the individual transitional paths towards an integrated and coherent 
pluralism and the rule of law are considerably context-specific, due to their 
historical, political, socio-economic and geopolitical embeddedness. This implies 
that transplanting “best practices” from successful cases (Baltic States) may lead 
to unintended and even pathological consequences under different domestic 
conditions. Avoiding and mitigating reform pathologies, polarization and 
fragmentation should become the initial priorities of every reform. Only after 
building a unitary, stable and coherent core of legal, judicial and political 
structures (based on a common identity and generally accepted values), may an 
opening towards more pluralism be reasonable. 
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